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Abstract
Consumer reviews on platforms like Amazon are summarized into star ratings, used toweight search results, and consulted
by consumers to guide purchase decisions. They are emblematic of the interactive digital environment that has purport‐
edly transferred power frommarketers to ‘regular people,’ and yet they represent the infiltration of promotional concerns
into online information, as has occurred in search and social media content. Consumers’ ratings and reviews do promo‐
tional work for brands—not just for products but the platforms that host reviews—that money can’t always buy. Gains in
power by consumers are quickly met with new strategies of control by companies who depend on reviews for reputational
capital. Focusing on ecommerce giant Amazon, this article examines the complexities of online reviews, where individual
efforts to provide product feedback and help others make choices become transformed into an information commodity
and promotional vehicle. It acknowledges the ambiguous nature of reviews due to the rise of industries and business prac‐
tices that influence or fake reviews as a promotional strategy. In response are yet other business practices and platform
policies aiming to provide better information to consumers, protect the image of platforms that host reviews, and punish
‘bad actors’ in competitive markets. The complexity in the production, regulation, andmanipulation of product ratings and
reviews illustrates how the high stakes of attention in digital spaces create fertile ground for disinformation, which only
emphasizes to users that they inhabit a ‘post‐truth’ reality online.
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1. Introduction
Consumer reviews seem to fulfill the promise of an inter‐
active digital environment transferring power from mar‐
keters to ‘regular people’ (Kuehn, 2017; Novak, 2021).
The ubiquitous gold and red stars representing user rat‐
ings are a constant in the aesthetics and rhetorics of digi‐
tal space being more user‐centered and democratic than
pre‐digital markets. Feedback from ordinary users repre‐
sents the values of Web 2.0, a metaphor describing how
the web has steadily offered more interactivity, making
the internet a more participatory and democratic space
(DiNucci, 1999; O’Reilly, 2005). Yelp, a reviewing app for
restaurants and other local businesses, used the slogan
“Real People, Real Reviews” for a time, presenting itself—
Kuehn (2017) argues—as a “review democracy” (p. 206).
Ratings and reviews did not originate with Web 2.0,
even if they seem native to this era. Travel guidebooks
from the 19th century introduced a star‐rating system
to indicate sights of special interest and hotels of qual‐
ity (Bruce, 2010). Star rating systems were then adopted
by restaurant and film reviewers in the first half of
the 20th century (Bialik, 2009; Harp, 2002). Whereas
star ratings historically were a summary of an individ‐
ual reviewer’s evaluation, decades later, websites like
Metacritic and Rotten Tomatoes added the innovation of
aggregating critic ratings, just as consumer ratings were
being datafied on sites like Amazon. As with so much
that accrues value online, it’s through aggregation that
ratings acquire their impact, providing an impression‐at‐
a‐glance to the prospective consumer, bragging rights
or a tarnished image for the product brand, a valuable
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information commodity for the platform, and a key data
point for the platform’s algorithms. By quantifying sub‐
jective responses to a product, be it a book or a house‐
hold item, star‐ratings flatten the qualitative differences
among products and place them for linear comparison,
be it on number of stars, number of ratings, or a combina‐
tion of both.While this might be frustrating to producers
andbrands, it’s also understandable that consumers seek
out and rely on these ratings to navigate an ecommerce
environment of overwhelming abundance (Graham &
Henman, 2019).
Consumer reviews reflect theorizations of late cap‐
italism that focus on the circulation of information
and affect. Political theorist Dean (2005) has warned
against the fantasies of abundance and participation
offered by the current state of “communicative capi‐
talism.” Whereas in previous communication environ‐
ments, Dean argues, wewould communicate “messages”
with a particular use‐value to which we expected some
kind of response, in a socially‐networked setting of abun‐
dance, we make “contributions” that through their cir‐
culation acquire exchange value, but to which we are
much less likely to get a response (p. 58). Leaving online
reviews and ratings on ecommerce sites very much fits
Dean’s critique, where we may feel called on to partici‐
pate, even though our individual contribution is unlikely
to register. It is only at volume and wide circulation that
reviews in aggregate begin to ‘count.’ In fact, the more
reviews are created, the less likely one particular review
will be read or make an impact. Dean’s concern is that
these voluminous expressions of popular will in the mar‐
ketplace are embraced as ‘democratic’ when actual polit‐
ical governance is far from it. In communicative capi‐
talism, Dean writes, “commercial choices” are treated
as “the paradigmatic form of choice per se” (p. 55).
“Communicative exchanges,” commonly understood to
be foundational to the working of democracy, actually
uphold “capitalist production” rather than democratic
governance (p. 56).
Communication scholar Hearn (2010) offers a simi‐
lar critique, adding a focus on affect as central to how
markets work in late, and particularly digital, capitalism:
“If markets are conversations, then value must be gener‐
ated through our visible, affective and quantifiable par‐
ticipation in these conversations” (pp. 421–422). This
“fragile, fluid enactment of value” is reputational capital,
a component of symbolic capital, argues Cronin (2016),
that must be continuously accumulated and circulated,
rather than earned once and for all (p. 399). Hearn (2010)
identifies online rating and ranking systems as “places
where the expression of feeling is ostensibly constituted
as ‘reputation’ and then mined for value” (p. 422).
Reviews are both informational and affective, and
affect drives attention. Tech theorist Goldhaber (1997)
offers the attention economy as a fundamental concept
for understanding the internet’s impact on the circula‐
tion of value, suggesting that the scarcity of attention
resulting from the explosion in information has become a
significant shaper of society relative even to the scarcity
of money or natural resources. Attention breeds atten‐
tion, to the point that attention becomes its own cur‐
rency. The star rating purports to index both attention
and affect, and has become practically a pre‐requisite to
selling on Amazon.
As Dean and Hearn imply, consumer ratings and
reviews are an example of the “free labor” that ordi‐
nary users perform that creates value, for platforms espe‐
cially (Terranova, 2000). Critical scholars studying this
online practice question how users are encouraged to
‘participate’ in ways that primarily benefit large corpo‐
rations, cultivating an ethos or aesthetic of democrati‐
zation rather than concrete gains in the distribution of
power (Kuehn, 2017; Novak, 2021). Hearn (2010), for
example, questions whether the ‘wisdom of the crowd’
really “signals the rise of a new form of ethical politics,”
since digital reputation functions “through forms of mar‐
ket discipline and affective conditioning… which work to
direct humanmeaning‐making and self‐identity in highly
motivated and profitable ways” (p. 423).
On the other hand, consumer reviews do level the
playing field between business and consumers at least
to an extent, allowing consumers to warn others about
badproducts and services, or rave about those that shine.
Based on interviews with Yelp reviewers, Kuehn reports
that “participants were committed to empowering con‐
sumers to make the best of available choices,” describ‐
ing their reviews as a “public service” and even a “job”
(2017, pp. 212–213). Sellers are certainly very aware of
the newly empowered consumer, and seem to dispute
the concern that a single online review has no impact.
A book aimed at prospective sellers on Amazon observes:
Never before has a single consumer‐driven action had
this kind of immediate weight and capability to cat‐
apult a new brand to success. In the days before
eComm and social media, consumers who bought
your product in a store could love it or hate it but you
might never know exactly what they thought or why.
Now, one product review can reach the entire world,
and the impact this has on your brand reputation can‐
not be overstated. (McGinn & Segal, 2019, p. 76)
But as in so many power relationships, gains by con‐
sumers are quickly met with strategies of control.
Consumer review spaces initially granted more voice
to consumers to punish and reward market actors.
But as the promotional value of consumer ratings has
become clearer, especially for new players with less
brand recognition who see the opportunity in ecom‐
merce to compete inmany product areas, the businesses
being reviewed have sought to exert greater control over
them, whether subtly incentivizing high ratings, or bla‐
tantly gaming the system with fraudulent content.
Both product brands and platform brands encour‐
age consumers to provide reviews and consult others’
feedback in their purchase decisions. But when it comes
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to the quality of reviews, platforms generally prioritize
authenticity, since the success of their brands depends
on trust. There are exceptions, since positive reviews
can ingratiate ad‐buying clients (e.g., allegations that
Yelp adjusted positive vs. negative reviews depending on
whether businesses advertised on the site; Tsukayama,
2013), and well‐reviewed products drive sales of which
the platform may take a cut. While platform brands bal‐
ance their desire for authentic reviews with these other
considerations, many sellers do whatever it takes to cre‐
ate more and better reviews that trigger advantageous
search results and sales (He et al., 2020).
What has emerged is a field within the reputation
economy where the promotional value of a four‐ or five‐
star rating and glowing reviews in a consumer’s authen‐
tic voice is a central contested resource. As with informa‐
tion disorder more generally, the decline of gatekeepers
like buyers at large retailers and arms‐length review pub‐
lications like Consumer Reports initially democratized the
sphere of product evaluation and helped many more
players enter the marketplace. However, the decline of
gatekeepers has also sown chaos in the information envi‐
ronment. In the realm of consumer reviews, this has
resulted in layers of rules, regulations, and ways to eval‐
uate the authenticity of reviews by a variety of organiza‐
tions, followed by efforts to game and circumvent those
structures by sellers and reviewers‐for‐hire. The con‐
tested space of product reviews is also a contested space
in terms of who wins the consumer’s trust, and whose
version of the ‘truth’ prevails. From the consumer’s
perspective, either they proceed with little knowledge
of review pollution and end up sometimes purchasing
poor quality products as a result, or, if informed about
the push‐and‐pull around consumer ratings and reviews,
they learn how fierce the jockeying is when consumer
attention is at stake. Although social media platforms like
Facebook and YouTubehave attracted themost attention
as sites of information disorder, ecommerce platforms
like Amazon should not get a pass, especially when the
ratings and reviews being gamed send unsafe products,
or books and films with disinformation about health, his‐
tory, and science to the top of the search results (DiResta,
2019). “Computational propaganda and influence opera‐
tions,” DiResta (2018) points out, “are inexpensive, they
appear to be effective, and the tech platforms that built
the infrastructure are having a very difficult time stop‐
ping them” (p. 25). We’ll see that this is certainly true
for Amazon, which increasingly struggles to manage its
reviews space.
The rise of disinformation is associated with what
some describe as our contemporary ‘post‐truth’ era.
However, to some extent, consumer ratings and reviews
are not trading in ‘truth.’ Esposito and Stark (2019) argue
that users recognize that, as “second‐order observations”
of reality, reviews will be rife with subjectivity and error,
but their utility in the face of complexity overrides that
concern (p. 12). But even if the relationship between
product ratings and ‘reality’ is tenuous, the relative posi‐
tion of whatever is rated within a given system comes to
have the force of empirical comparison, creating its own
promotional reality (Cronin, 2016). The term ‘post‐truth,’
identified by the Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford Languages,
2016) as Word of the Year in 2016, is understood in a
variety of ways, from the downgrading of facts and evi‐
dence in favor of beliefs and emotion, and the preva‐
lence of lies and “bullshit” in public life, to the use of dis‐
tractions and strategic silences to divert audiences from
uncomfortable facts (Keane, 2018, para. 13). The muddy‐
ing of information and promotion is just one variant of
‘post‐truth,’ and not a new one. While consumers have
always been wary of the ways promotion can manip‐
ulate, digital space presents users with the blending
of information and promotion at every turn. We see
it in search results, recommendation algorithms, undis‐
closed promotional considerations from influencers, and
native advertising. Even when it’s just everyday prod‐
ucts with manipulated ratings, the disinformation that
creeps into almost every corner of online activity teaches
a broader lesson about the state of our ‘post‐truth’ soci‐
ety to consumers. The sense that all digital information is
rife with manipulation and promotionalism erodes trust
in platforms, fellow participants, and information itself
(Amazeen & Muddiman, 2018; DiResta, 2018; Kozinets,
et al., 2020).
This article examines the complexities of product
reviews and ratings on Amazon, where individual efforts
to provide businesses with feedback and help oth‐
ers make consumer choices become transformed into
an information commodity and promotional vehicle.
With estimates of Amazon’s market dominance ranging
between 37% and 50% of US ecommerce sales, every
decision that Amazon makes regarding its reviews is con‐
sequential for the fortunes of sellers and the informa‐
tion available to consumers (eMarketer Editors, 2020;
Wells et al., 2019). A close examination of Amazon’s
reviews space reveals an ongoing tug‐of‐war between a
tech giant that recognizes the value of reviews for driving
sales and for the platform’s informational value to con‐
sumers, and the third‐party sellers for whom Amazon is
practically the only game in town.
2. Amazon Ratings in the Reputation Economy
Hearn writes, “reputation is a cultural product, and as
such is conditioned by its mode of production” (2010,
pp. 423–444). So, what is the mode of production for
Amazon reviews, and how has this changed over time?
Amazon was one of the first commercial spaces to allow
users to post their own reviews, doing so since the site’s
launch in 1995. These reviews appeared alongside edi‐
torial content that Amazon invested in heavily in its
early years, in order to make its site feel like a legiti‐
mate place that provided useful information to the con‐
sumer who couldn’t leaf through books or consult a
sales associate. Amazon offered both these “modalities
of truth” to users, based in authoritative expertise as
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well as the experiences of ordinary consumers, in order
to build much‐needed trust and overcome hesitancy in
the early days of online shopping (Graham & Henman,
2019, pp. 2015–2016). Amazon invited site users to indi‐
cate if consumer reviews were ‘Helpful’ or ‘Not Helpful,’
and also allowed them to comment on them (the option
to ‘downvote’ a review was phased out starting in 2016,
seeMarth, 2016; and the comment featurewas removed
in 2020, see Dawson, 2020; although a ‘Report Abuse’
button appears under each review). In the earliest days
of ecommerce, Amazon’s reviewarchitecture anticipated
the world of likes and hearts and upvotes that we now
inhabit online.
By the late 1990s, the expense of hiring editors
and book reviewers compared to the efficiency of free
crowdsourced reviews became clearer to the company
that has consistently favored platform logics of ‘self‐
service’ over paying people to do things (Marcus, 2004).
For many years, consumer reviews were a useful but
rarely remarked upon feature of the site, as indicated
by press coverage. But a number of developments made
reviews a target for manipulation. In 1999, Amazon
opened its platform up to third‐party sellers. Then, in
2005 with the development of the Prime membership,
where consumers in the US (at least, initially) could pay
an annual fee for free two‐day shipping, vastly more
consumers and sellers flocked to the site, soon making
Amazon the first stop for online shoppers. The prod‐
uct selection exploded again in the mid‐2010’s when
Amazon made it easier for foreign companies to use its
marketplace, and Chinese sellers in particular flooded
the site with new products (Shepard, 2017). The advan‐
tage that a platform accrues due to network effects—
the greatest number of sellers, the biggest variety of
products, and the largest crowd of shoppers—made a
product’s rating on Amazon disproportionately impact‐
ful on sales, both on and off Amazon’s site since shop‐
pers may do product research on Amazon but buy else‐
where. As articulated in the business literature, “there is
no other platform with Amazon’s scale, reach, and buy‐
ing intent” (McGinn & Segal, 2019, pp. 15–16).
Third‐party sellers are right to be concerned about
the volume and quality of reviews for their products.
According to a 2018 survey by Pew, 93% of Americans
consult customer reviews when buying a product for
the first time (Turner & Rainie, 2020). Ratings make a
measurable difference in sales, especially for new or
lesser‐known products and brands. One ecommerce con‐
sultant even argues that “reviews are more important
than a brand,” observing that “there’s major brands
that are being crushed by small direct‐to‐Amazon or
direct‐to‐consumer brands” (Matsakis, 2019, para. 6).
Business scholar Luca (2011) found that a one‐star dif‐
ference in Yelp ratings was associated with a 5 to 9%
increase in revenue for Seattle‐area restaurants. In con‐
trast, an ecommerce consultant estimates that a one‐star
rating increase results in a 26% increase in product
sales on Amazon (Nguyen, 2019b), a claim reinforced
by He et al.’s (2020) findings of large and statistically
significant improvements in product sales and search
ranking after sellers bought fake reviews on Facebook
groups, at least in the short term. The importance of
Amazon reviews and ratings for new products is clear
from the frequency with which press releases tout a new
product’s star ratings and reviews (e.g., “Reusable kids’
icePack,’’ 2020).
Ranking high in search on Amazon is crucial for visibil‐
ity, or ‘discoverability,’ and therefore for sales. According
to Amazon, “70% of customers never click past the first
page of search results,” and “the first three items dis‐
played in search results account for 64% of clicks” (CPC
Strategy, 2018, p. 22). Although the specifics of the A9
ranking algorithm, Amazon’s search algorithm, are pro‐
prietary, the received wisdom among sellers is that the
primary factors driving search ranking are: relevance
of product key terms to search terms, sales velocity,
price, and product availability (Dod, n.d.; Feedvisor, n.d.;
McGinn & Segal, 2019). Opinion differs on whether rat‐
ings (both the volume of ratings and the average rat‐
ing) are directly considered by the algorithm, or whether
their influence is indirect via impact on sales. Regardless
of whether star ratings factor in directly or indirectly, it’s
clear from the trade press and business services com‐
panies targeting Amazon sellers that this constituency
believes they matter, making them part of Amazon’s
“algorithmic imaginary” (Bucher, 2017). In many ways
Amazon’s site has opened the world of retail up to more
sellers, particularly small businesses, by allowing them
to circumvent the gatekeeping of retail buyers and lim‐
ited distribution networks. However, as Andrejevic et al.
(2015) have pointed out, “information organizers” like
Amazon are “the new gatekeepers,” and their control
over the information used in these algorithms and the
priorities “baked into” them shape our information land‐
scape just as traditional gatekeepers did, but in different
ways (p. 386).
Product reviews suffer from serious grade inflation.
A 2014 study found a sample of Amazon books were
reviewedwith five stars on average 59% of the time, with
only 4.8% of the reviews having only one star (Anderson
& Simester, 2014). And average ratings have only been
going up since then, correlating with an increase in
efforts to produce incentivized reviews as the number
of sellers on Amazon’s marketplace has exploded over
the last decade (Nguyen, 2018a). He et al. (2020) found
that a large sample of more than 200,000 products listed
on Amazon had a mean rating of 4.2. Many consumers
are mistrustful of products with less than a four‐star
rating. Kennedy and Hill (2018) argue that “emotions
matter for everyday engagements with data,” and that
data visualizations, such as star ratings, are read not just
cognitively but affectively (p. 844). The frequency with
which we see products associated with star ratings of
four or more has likely imprinted that range as a marker
of acceptable quality, conveying comfort and confidence
to most consumers.
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Leveraging consumers’ positive affect towards the
image of the star rating, Amazon has leaned into four or
more stars as core to its brand value and identity by open‐
ing a new brick‐and‐mortar store concept called Amazon
4‐Star in 2018. As the name suggests, these stores fea‐
ture products that have received ratings of at least four
stars;many products display a favorable customer review
in addition to the star rating (see Figure 1). The digital
price tags show the exact rating out of five, as well as the
number of reviews, just as products appear online.
This store concept instantiates Amazon’s desire to
be a destination for highly‐rated products, and sends
the message that the signal of quality is a four‐ to
five‐star rating.
3. Review Pollution
For the first 10 to 15 years of Amazon’s history, its
consumer reviews did not attract a great deal of atten‐
tion, other than being mentioned as an attractive bonus
feature of the site. When they did attract attention,
it was typically for being humorous, used for ‘culture
jamming’—a trend that took off in the early 2000s—as
in the scathing and hilarious reviews of “Bic Pens for
Her,” or unintentionally funny, such as reviews for clas‐
sic books by unimpressed readers (Suddath, 2005).
In 2005 publicly visible concerns about the manipu‐
lation of consumer reviews on Amazon’s retail platform
started to arise. A study by David and Pinch (2006) esti‐
mating that 1% of book reviews on Amazon were, at
least in part, copied from other reviews received a fair
amount of press attention. By 2010, as Amazon’s dom‐
inance of ecommerce became undeniable, attention to
manipulated reviews started exploding, especially for
books. Stories started emerging with some frequency
about individual authors covertly writing reviews for
their own books as well as their rivals, as well as sys‐
tematic efforts to game the system through companies
whose sole purpose was to produce fake reviews (e.g.,
Charman‐Anderson, 2012; Katz, 2010). Newspapers and
magazines started to feature regular pieces on how
to spot fake product reviews (e.g., Hagemeier, 2012;
The Better Business Bureau, 2017).
Amazon’s own rules at this time merely stated that
no reviews should be posted by someone with a conflict
of interest, and that any form of financial compensation
had to be clearly disclosed in the review. In other words,
the site did not allow “anyone to write reviews as a form
of promotion” without disclosing it as such (Amazon,
2020b, para. 3). But with few monitoring systems and a
structure that allowed anyone with a customer account
to post a review, regardless of whether they had bought
the product, the feature was ripe for exploitation.
Around the time of Prime’s launch in 2005, social
media platforms began to explode. Facebook groups and
other online spaces, eventually including Slack, Discord,
Telegram, and subreddits, became convenient places to
recruit people willing to write glowing reviews and leave
five‐star ratings in exchange for a fee, or even just for the
free product or a rebate (Nguyen, 2018a). Sellers also buy
Facebook ads offering free products, linking users to chat‐
bots that organize the entire transaction (Nguyen, 2019a).
Figure 1. Signage at Amazon 4‐Star in New York City. Photos by author.
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By the early 2010s, Amazon started to crack down
on review pollution. Since at least 2011, if Amazon has
a record of the person leaving the review having actually
bought the item, it is labeled as a ‘Verified Purchase,’ to
give users confidence in its authenticity (e.g., Mooney,
2011); consumers can filter reviews so they only see
the verified purchases (see Figure 2). In 2015, Amazon
launched high‐profile lawsuits against individuals and
websites known to be posting or facilitating compen‐
sated reviews (Mendoza, 2015), and in 2016 Amazon
banned reviews incentivized with compensation, even
if disclosed (Dwoskin & Timberg, 2018). Amazon regu‐
larly blocks shoppers who are caught or suspected of
writing inauthentic or compensated reviews (Dwoskin
& Timberg, 2018). Also since 2015, verified purchases
have greater weight in a product’s average rating (Rubin,
2015). Today Amazon explains that a product’s average
star rating is not a simple mean, but is determined by
machine learning that takes into account “how recent
the rating or review is and verified purchase status,” as
well as “multiple criteria that establish the authenticity
of the feedback” (Amazon, 2020c, para. 1), including the
number of ‘helpful’ upvotes by site users (Rubin, 2015).
Reviews from unverified purchasers are not calculated
into a product’s average without “more details in the
form of text, image, or video” (Amazon, 2020c, para. 2).
And now, to even be eligible to post a review, a customer
must have spent at least $50 on Amazon in the previous
12 months (Amazon, 2020a).
However, Amazon’s regulatory moves have merely
shaped how companies game the system. Instead of just
paying people to post authentic‐sounding reviews, sell‐
ers now find Amazon account‐holders willing to buy the
item with their own credit card, leave a review (often
after a waiting period, so the review looks more authen‐
tic and avoids Amazon’s automated systems that flag
suspicious review behavior), and then get reimbursed
from the company once the review is posted (DiResta,
2019; He et al., 2020; Nguyen, 2018a). Sometimes these
arrangements involve a small payment on top of the
reimbursement. The expense to the seller is consider‐
able (free goods and shipping, even payments), but both
research and industry experience show that, in the short‐
term at least, it is effective in improving placement
in search rankings and increasing sales (DiResta, 2019;
He et al., 2020; Nguyen, 2018a).
The term platform evokes a foundation—some kind
of digital space or software capability—that allows dif‐
ferent stakeholders (consumers and sellers, or users and
advertisers) to interact (Srnicek, 2017). As a platform,
Amazon is always serving two constituencies. Amazon’s
‘number one principle’ is customer obsession, but it also
needs to serve sellers. As Amazon became more aware
of how important consumer reviews were for third‐party
sellers, it developed in‐house programs to connect sell‐
ers with reviewers, allowing what the company’s rules
have not since 2016: giving free products to consumers
with the hope of getting them reviewed on Amazon’s
platform (with the exception of books, since distributing
free books to generate reviews is an industry‐standard
practice). Amazon Vine, launched in 2007, enrolls ‘super
reviewers’ by Amazon’s invitation only. The program
rewards the company’s most enthusiastic and consistent
reviewers, while also providing a much‐needed opportu‐
nity to gain review momentum for sellers. In addition, in
2017 Amazon started the Early Reviewing program that
allowed sellers to ask Amazon to contact customers who
have purchased a new product and ask them to write an
honest review in exchange for a modest ($1–3) Amazon
gift card (Kelley, 2017; but this programwas discontinued
in 2021, see Masters, 2021).
Amazon is cracking down on fake and incentivized
reviews not only because they undermine itsmost impor‐
tant asset—consumer trust of its brand—but because it
wants to funnel these illicit marketing dollars away from
third‐parties and towards its own advertising platforms.
Figure 2. Sorting by Verified Purchases only is one of the options for sorting reviews on Amazon’s site. Screenshot by
author.
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 144–154 149
Amazon would rather sellers pay for Sponsored Products
(ads for particular search terms) or Sponsored Brands
(banner at top of page after search) or use Amazon’s DSP
(Demand Side Platform) to buy individually targeted ads.
Or, Amazon would rather use sellers’ desire for a critical
mass of consumer reviews to drive them into expensive
Amazon programs like Brand Registry, a prerequisite for
enrolling in Amazon’s Vine and Early Reviewer programs.
When sellers or government officials complain about
fake reviews, Amazon says it spends millions of dollars
to ensure their authenticity, including refining machine
learning that spots fake reviews by their language, tim‐
ing, or patterns in customer accounts (DiResta, 2019;
Dzieza, 2018; Masters, 2021; Nguyen, 2019b). Over time,
Amazon has slowly become a reluctant governor of its
reviews space. For example, in 2015 Amazon was heavily
criticized for allowing conspiracy theorist ‘brigading’ in
reviews for books written by survivors and parents of vic‐
tims of the Sandy Hook school shooting in Newtown, CT.
Amazon’s positionwas that any authentic reviews should
stand on the site, whether the book had been purchased
by the reviewer on Amazon or not (many of those post‐
ing had certainly neither purchased nor read the books;
Greene, 2015). Coordinated campaigns to boost or tank
a product (and its associated ideas) weren’t a problem,
as long as the reviews were real people’s real opinions
(Greene, 2015). But by 2020, when the novel American
Dirt was attracting critical reviews due to its depiction
of a Mexican immigrant’s experience by a White author,
Amazon restricted what reviews could appear to veri‐
fied purchases, in an effort to prevent the reviews sec‐
tion becoming a forum for political debate, a decision
also made for A Very Stable Genius, a book critical of
President Trump (Scott, 2020).
In 2019 Amazon made it easier for consumers to
give feedback about products, with ‘One‐Tap Ratings.’
This feature, which invites users to rate a product they
have purchased with just ‘one tap,’ rather than the more
unwieldy process that requiredwritten feedback in order
to leave a rating, would seem to invitemore fake reviews,
and some critics say this has been the outcome (“Report:
Fake online reviews,” 2020). But Amazon’s intent was to
get more participation from legitimate, representative
purchasers that would hopefully drown out the fake and
incentivized reviews that unscrupulous sellers are buying
(Del Ray, 2020). This move signals that Amazon thinks
there’s only so much that can be done about the com‐
pensated reviews solicited in Facebook groups and other
hard‐to‐track places on the web. The ‘one‐tap’ solution
seeks to turn those reviews into ‘noise,’ as well as build
confidence among consumers from the greater volume
of ratings. Someproducts, particularly popular tech prod‐
ucts, have tens of thousands of ratings, such as the Kindle
Paperwhite with more than 83,000 ratings, much more
than its 28,905 reviews.
The sheer abundance of ratings lends a sheen of
democratic authenticity to the aggregated rating, just as
Dean (2005) predicts that the abundance of communica‐
tion facilitated by digital technologies will be leveraged
by capital. We’re invited to ‘participate,’ and Amazon has
made it as easy as possible, primarily to protect its rep‐
utation as a platform with reliable product information
from real customers. More ratings, even if they’re not
connected to written reviews, make sellers happy, build
confidence in consumers, and cement Amazon’s domi‐
nance in product ratings as an information commodity,
which in turn contributes to its monopoly‐like control of
ecommerce in many markets.
Despite Amazon’s regulatory efforts, observers say
that review pollution is getting worse. Amazon may not
be trying hard enough. As DiResta points out, many
of the Facebook groups that recruit reviewers are very
easy to find (as cited in Dwoskin & Timberg, 2018), and
the changes Amazon has made don’t seem proportion‐
ate to the scale of the problem (DiResta, 2019). But
it’s also the case that the strategies sellers use create a
game of whack‐a‐mole for the platform. In addition to
the techniques already described, sellers place negative
reviews on their competitors’ products, engage in suspi‐
cious reviewing behavior (such as rapidly posting many
5‐star reviews) on their competitors’ listings in the hopes
of Amazon removing them from the platform (Masters,
2021), hijack well‐rated products’ listings with their own
products (Nguyen, 2018b), create dummy accounts using
people’s real names and addresses to post fake reviews
(Masters, 2021), and hire click‐farms to show activity on
a product listing in relation to search terms or to vote
particular reviews as ‘helpful.’ As one journalist put it,
Amazon “must constantly implement new rules andpenal‐
ties, which in turn, become tools for new abuses, which
require yet more rules to police” (Dzieza, 2018, para. 7).
4. Conclusions: Governing Review Disinformation
Amazon’s sheer size and dominance of ecommercemake
it effectively its own field, in whichmultiple players vie to
come out on top in relation to the company’s rules and
incentives. Because of Amazon’s devotion to automation,
a cottage industry of companies has sprung up to help
sellers navigate the platform. Often populated by former
Amazon employees, companies like Feedvisor and Buy
Box Experts help with product listing content, pricing,
search engine optimization, advertising strategies, and
fulfillment through Amazon. A subset of these compa‐
nies focus specifically on helping sellers get the critical
mass of consumer reviews to boost them in search by
using Amazon’s automated services that send messages
to customers who have bought their product, including
Salesbacker and eComEngine. These companies openly
advertise their services and operate within the letter—
if not always the spirit—of Amazon’s rules, unlike the
countless entities operating in Facebook groups or other
hard‐to‐track places who solicit reviews in contravention
of the rules.
While these third‐party companies are seller‐facing,
others have arisen to help the average consumer
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interpret the authenticity of product reviews. Fakespot
and ReviewMeta both offer this service, using data
science to estimate which reviews are untrustworthy.
Fakespot evaluates the reliability of reviews with a letter
grade, while ReviewMeta re‐calculates a product’s aver‐
age ratingwith the suspect reviews removed orweighted
less. ReviewMeta considers 12 factors in its review eval‐
uations, including the average difference in verified vs.
unverified purchases, the degree of phrase repetition
in the reviews, past reviewing behavior of the reviewer,
and the distribution of reviews over time. These review
adjusters aim for transparency in how they judge reviews
to be unreliable and how that impacts their overall eval‐
uation, while acknowledging, as ReviewMeta founder
Noonan (2016) does, that “unnatural review detection
is not an exact science.” Indeed, the two services some‐
times arrive at different evaluations of the same set of
reviews, indicating the degree of interpretation involved
(Broida, 2019).
In 2020, with more consumers than ever turning to
online shopping during the Covid‐19 pandemic, review
manipulation appeared to reach, itself, epidemic propor‐
tions. Fakespot estimated that 42% of Amazon reviews
from March to September of 2020 were unreliable,
up from 36% in the same period the previous year,
a rate previously only seen in peak shopping seasons
(“Report: Fake online reviews,” 2020). ReviewMeta esti‐
mates that the average number of suspicious reviews is
higher, greater than 50% and as high as 2/3 for partic‐
ular product categories, such as electronics and health
aids (including weight‐loss pills, testosterone boosters;
Dwoskin & Timberg, 2018). According to testimony from
many small sellers, paying for reviews is increasingly seen
as just part of the cost of doing business on the platform.
Greater manipulation of its ratings and reviews,
combined with more frequent PR challenges around
the authenticity of consumer feedback, have pushed
Amazon into undertaking greater governance of this
aspect of its platform. Amazon knows that “perceived
review manipulation” is a threat to the value that con‐
sumers see in their ecommerce brand (Xu, 2021, p. 4).
Amazon’s governance of reviews provides the appear‐
ance of action for public relations purposes, and aims
also to be pre‐emptive against government—the Federal
Trade Commission in the US context—taking a greater
interest in review authenticity. But the steps Amazon
has taken stay within its preferred ways of operating and
skew towards systems that tie sellers closer to the com‐
pany and its paid services. Rather than focusing solely on
preventing fraudulent reviews, Amazon has lowered the
bar for more consumers to rate the products they buy,
consistent with every platform’s bias towards greater
engagement. Amazon may have disallowed consumers
writing reviews for products they received free, or at a
deep discount, but they facilitate this exact process for
the sellers who participate in paid programs that pull
them deeper into Amazon’s seller ecosystem. Amazon
has built tremendous trustwith consumers after 25 years
of ‘customer obsession,’ and it depends on this reserve
of trust in the midst of an explosion of review pollution
on its platform.
Critiques of how exactly Amazon governs its reviews
space and whether its rules are effective in reducing
review pollution may be relevant for third‐party sell‐
ers and concerned shoppers, but they don’t address
the bigger picture. It’s only because Amazon is so
dominant in ecommerce, akin to “essential infrastruc‐
ture” (Khan, 2017, p. 803) at least in the US, that
the ways it shapes and constrains consumer reviews
become so high stakes, making or breaking some busi‐
nesses, for example, or allowing significant numbers of
faulty or dangerous products to circulate in the market‐
place, despite seemingly rave reviews. The US Federal
Trade Commission, whose purview includes truth‐in‐
advertising, has made stern inquiries and even brought
a case against a company selling on Amazon in relation
to manipulated reviews and false claims for its prod‐
ucts (Musil, 2019). The Commission also insists that com‐
pensated reviews always be disclosed. But on balance,
in the US at least, governance is ceded to the plat‐
forms, with some movement in just the last few years
from both the House Judiciary Committee and Trade
Commission to investigate the major tech platforms for
practices that are anti‐competitive or hurt small busi‐
nesses. On March 25th, 2021, the House Energy and
Commerce Committee conducted a hearing with the
CEOs of Facebook, Google, and Twitter on the topic of
“Disinformation Nation: Social Media’s Role in Promoting
Extremism and Misinformation.” Notably absent was
Amazon, despite the fact that its reviews space, content
platforms, and recommendation algorithms have been
implicated in the distribution and amplification of dis‐
information (DiResta, 2019). While regulators are start‐
ing to take notice of the most spectacular and brazen
abuses of tech platforms, the broader issues of the out‐
sized power of information gatekeepers like Amazon, and
the ways they police themselves and others in situations
when they have conflicting business incentives, seem
currently beyond their reach. Meanwhile, the everyday,
routinized nature of disinformation like review pollution
contributes to the steady erosion of social trust in infor‐
mation, institutions, and other people. The damage done
to our information environment by something as seem‐
ingly trivial as manipulated product reviews points to the
need for systemic responses to the oligopolistic, infras‐
tructural, and self‐serving nature of tech platforms.
While consumer reviews were at one time a key rea‐
son for the trust that people developed for Amazon’s
ecommerce site, those same review spaces now threaten
that trust. The star ratings only serve as effective promo‐
tion when people think they have informational value.
Trust is, itself, a valuable commodity, but it’s also more
than that. Trust is fundamental to the social contract,
and to our ability to communicate with and coordinate
with others. As consumers become used to the idea that
they have to be everyday detectives, combing through
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reviews or using third‐party browser extensions to esti‐
mate which reviews are genuine in order to make a sim‐
ple online shopping decision, they become more firmly
interpellated into an emerging common sense about the
contemporary internet: that no one can be trusted, and
everything found online is the result of a complex, never‐
ending contest for reputational capital among competing
interests and powerful organizations. It’s a lesson about
being small and powerless, even though it all began as
an effort to make the consumer feel like their voice, and
the voices of their fellow consumers, mattered.
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